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Opting Out, Collective Contracts and Labour Flexibility: 
Firm-Level Evidence for the Italian Case 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the last few years, different types of firm-level derogations from national and sectoral collective 
bargaining have received growing attention in many European countries, particularly since the 2008 
economic crisis. In response to high unemployment rates, academics and policy makers have 
maintained that firms need more flexibility in bargaining processes (European Commission, 2015). 
“Controlled forms of deviation (opening, derogation, deviation clauses) as well as less controlled 
forms (such as general opt-out clauses) have been interpreted as major aspects of the trend towards 
more decentralized bargaining and a strengthening of flexibility of collective agreements that began 
in the early 1990s in Western Europe” (Eurofound, 2015, p. 32). Since the Great Recession, these 
different types of deviations have been accompanied by temporary derogations from national norms 
and rules set at the sectoral level1. 
The theme of opting out contributes to the discussion of the functioning of two-tier bargaining 
systems in which multi-employer agreements coexist with firm level or territorial agreements (Boeri, 
2014). These collective bargaining systems are still the object of an on-going debate. Two opposing 
positions seem to have emerged. On the one hand, employers and their organizations emphasize that 
the decentralization of collective bargaining may remove overly rigid pay and working conditions 
that have reduced firm competitiveness and caused wide job destruction, especially since the 2008 
crisis, and accelerated global competition. On the other hand, workers and their representatives signal 
that derogations from norms and sectoral agreements might cause only the deterioration of pay and 
working conditions, resulting in unfair competition, and the loss of the solidarity dimension of 
collective bargaining beyond the enterprise level (Eurofound, 2015, p. 31). Furthermore, bargaining 
rules facilitating the adoption of more flexible fixed-term contracts may reduce the incentives to 
invest in firm-specific human capital for both employers and employees (Pinelli et al., 2017). 
Concerning the actual efficacy of general opt-out clauses (OPTC), recent studies – which are mostly 
available for the German case – have explored their role in explaining the sensitivity of wages to firm-
level performance (OECD, 2017a). Fewer studies have been devoted to analysing the impact of OPTC 
on labour working conditions and their effects on job growth (Brändle and Heinbach, 2013). Totally 
absent, at least to our knowledge, is research on the actual influence of opting out on the structure of 
labour demand (open-ended and fixed-term employees) and on the resurgence of labour productivity 
growth. 
Our main research question is to shed light on the Italian case and test the role of OPTC on various 
dimensions of firm-level labour flexibility, that is, the share of fixed-term contracts on total firm-level 
employment, labour flows (both creation and destruction of jobs), net job growth and labour 
productivity. 
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The Italian experience is valuable in addressing this issue because in this country, after the new 
norms adopted in 2011 (Article 8, Law 148/2011), firms were allowed to derogate from laws and 
sectoral agreements on working time and conditions for temporary employment. In the context of 
policy evaluation, we intend to verify whether the predominant aims of derogations from sectoral 
agreements have been adjustments in working time to obtain higher job growth rates and improve 
productivity or if OPTC have favoured mainly the adoption of temporary contracts through a 
substitution effect with permanent contracts. 
Finally, we test whether OPTC, favouring temporary jobs, have encouraged a selection mechanism 
of more skilled and motivated workers with positive productivity effects or have been associated with 
low levels of retention and motivation of temporary staff. 
We examine these issues using rich firm-level panel data obtained through an employer and 
employee survey (Rilevazione su Imprese e Lavoro, RIL) conducted by the National Institute for 
Public Policies Analysis (INAPP) in 2011 and 2015. We have, on average, 2,500 Italian firms from 
non-agricultural sectors, and the available dataset offers detailed information about industrial 
relations and firm and worker characteristics. 
First, we perform preliminary OLS and fixed effects estimates using OPTC as our key variable. 
Second, we adopt a policy evaluation framework based on the introduction of Article 8 (Law 
148/2011). In this second step, we implement Diff-in-Diff estimates combined with the kernel 
propensity score (KPS_DID) to measure the differences in the outcome variables (labour flexibility, 
job growth and productivity) that occur between 2010 and 2014 among firms that received the 
treatment (OPTC firms) versus those that did not (NO-OPTC firms). 
We find that in Italy, opting out allows the firm to only enjoy ‘marginal flexibility’, with progressive 
changes in the composition of temporary/regular workers and no significant impact on net job growth 
or labour productivity, as hypothesized by Boeri and Garibaldi (2007). 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic literature and the institutional 
background. Section 3 introduces the data and presents the sample selection issues and descriptive 
statistics. Section 4 illustrates the econometric strategy and the identification assumptions before 
discussing the main results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature 
 
2.1 Collective agreements and opt-out clauses in Europe 
Sectoral bargaining, which dominates in some continental European countries (OECD, 2017a), 
has been seen as a potential cause for rigidity concerning labour organisations (i.e., working hours, 
tasks and assignment of personnel), which does not allow firms to adopt proper strategies to face 
adverse business phases, particularly when coordination between sectoral and firm-level bargaining 
is insufficient (Calmfors and Driffil, 1988). This rigid institutional setting may be responsible for 
limited wage dispersion and negative impacts on employment outcomes, especially when worker 
representatives have more bargaining power, as suggested by the union employment literature (see, 
among others, Bryson, 2014 for a short overview). To counter these adverse effects, during recent 
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decades, some countries have increased the decentralization of bargaining and introduced new 
measures of flexibility, such as derogations and opt-out clauses, to permit firm-level negotiators to 
deviate from agreements set at higher levels (OECD, 2017a, p. 18). In countries such as France and 
Spain, the introduction of OPTC to obtain lower wage increases than those stipulated in the 
centralized contracts has been exchanged with provisions for short-term work and other forms of 
working time reduction at the company level (Eurofound, 2015). 
However, specific literature aimed at assessing the influence of these derogations is still 
underdeveloped, and most studies refer to the German case. 
Based on the available literature, many different effects can be expected. 
First, higher wage flexibility may be obtained by firms that adopt derogations. 
Indeed, an extensive decentralization of wage setting, with a wide diffusion of opening clauses, 
has been one of the main forces enabling German firms to cut unit labour costs and has likely 
contributed to restoring firm competitiveness (Dustman et al. 2014). Additionally, less productive 
non-exporter firms, threatened by import competition, have used local wage flexibility, allowed by 
opening clauses, to face the increase in international competition on product markets (Heinbach and 
Schröpfer, 2008).  
Interestingly, Devicienti et al. (2019) discuss the differences between Germany and Italy in terms of 
their collective bargaining institutions. They argue that, despite the similar growth in earning 
dispersion recorded in both countries in the last decades, wage inequalities in Germany are mainly 
driven by the wage premium dispersion allowed by opting out, whereas in Italy enterprises have been 
unable to deviate from the wage dynamics set by national sectoral agreements. In Italy, the earning 
dispersion has entirely occurred between job titles defined by unions and employer associations in 
national industry-wide agreements, and not by variability in firm wage policies. As Devicienti et al. 
2019 suggest “This may explain why, unlike in the German case, the variance of Italian firms’ wage 
policies has not widened over time, despite the fact that also Italy has been exposed to the long-run 
challenges posed by the introduction of new technologies and increased international competition” ( 
p. 395). 
Garloff and Guertzegen (2012) find that workers in Germany obtain a risk premium in exchange 
for the flexibility potential provided by opt-out clauses. It is likely that employers can afford higher 
wages if they have the right to reduce wages in times of negative performance. Additionally, Garloff 
and Guertzegen find that the wage mark-up relative to industry-level contracts is higher for below-
average-performing firms compared to their best-performing counterparts. The authors suggest that 
“this finding is either consistent with a risk premium in exchange for a flexible profit response or, 
alternatively, with the introduction of opt-out clauses being more likely in industries where the wage 
level is a priori high” (p. 744). 
Along similar lines, Ellguth et al. (2014) find higher wages in firms where opting out is possible and 
lower wages when opt-out clauses are actually applied. According to their interpretation, employers 
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can afford higher wages if they have the right to reduce wages in times of negative performance. 
Furthermore, these authors examine the interaction between works councils and opening clauses and 
show that works councils can counteract wage reductions induced by the application of opening 
clauses at the establishment level. 
In the same line of research, but in terms of responsiveness to business cycles, Brändle and 
Heinbach (2013) examine the role of opening clauses on job flows, such as job creation and 
destruction, verifying the distinct role of i) the possibility of OPTC, ii) knowledge of this possibility, 
and iii) the actual application of OPTC. The authors obtain a positive but non-significant effect of the 
possibility of OPTC on job flows, whereas explicit knowledge and their actual application have no 
additional effect. They suggest that the mere possibility of OPTC may induce firms to hire more 
employees in periods with good economic conditions because they anticipate having the potential to 
cut labour costs in the case of worsening economic conditions. Hence, more wage flexibility and 
shorter working hours should decrease the rate of job destruction in times of crises. However, when 
economic conditions improve, firms will likely have to restore working hours and meet wage 
demands to compensate employees for their losses, thus causing lower rates of job creation. Hence, 
job creation does not exceed job destruction, and gross job turnover is not spurred by OPTC (Brändle 
and Heinbach, 2013). 
 
2.2 The Italian institutional setting 
 
The Italian regulation of collective bargaining has been defined by the 1993 Protocol, which 
established a two-tier bargaining framework based on the centrality of national sector-wide 
agreements (the first bargaining level) and limited space for decentralized bargaining at either the 
company level or territorial level (the second bargaining level), without the possibility of opting out. 
Decentralized bargaining was hierarchically secondary to national sectoral agreements and could 
cover issues not included in national sectoral agreements (the non-repeatability clause). Concerning 
remuneration, the second bargaining level was intended to amplify the incentive effects of the relative 
wage structure and to negotiate pay bonuses correlated with the achievement of productivity or 
profitability targets. Since the 1993 Agreement, Italy has become the Eurozone country with the 
highest share of employee contracts regulated by collective sectoral agreements (as documented by 
the Structure of Earning Survey of 2014) and with limited coverage of second-level bargaining. For 
our national sample of private no-agricultural firms, we observe that more than 90% of these 
enterprises had first-level sectoral bargaining in 2010 and 2014, whereas only approximately 17%2 
had decentralized agreements (mainly at the firm level or, in only a few cases, at the territorial level). 
More details for firms adopting or not adopting OPTC are reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
The current representation model is based on ‘unitary workplace union structures’, the so-called 
Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie (RSUs). These bodies have some of the main characteristics that 
usually typify works councils. They are elected by all employees but also are strictly linked to unions 
because workers’ representatives are elected from candidates of trade union lists (D'Amuri and 
Giorgiantonio, 2015). RSUs participate in firm-level negotiations, which usually include both 
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performance-related pay and working conditions and can stipulate company agreements. RSUs also 
flank the other firm-level bodies, Rappresentanze Sindacali Aziendali (RSAs), which are present in 
firms with more than 15 employees (as envisaged under Article 19 of Law 300/1970, the Workers’ 
Statute), are designed by trade unions and represent only union members. 
In the last few years, the Italian bargaining structure has been the subject of much discussion, 
especially after the 2008 crisis. The call for the progressive erosion of the centrality of national 
sectoral agreements culminated in the initiatives of the Fiat group; this corporation stipulated on 2010 
a group-level stand-alone agreement (first-level contract) and derogated from the national sectoral 
agreements (Eurofound, 2012). One year later, in 2011, parliament approved the 148 Law, whose 
main provision for industrial relations (Article 8) was the opportunity, for the first time, to derogate 
from national norms (mainly to introduce variations to working-time arrangements and rules for 
temporary contracts) and industry-wide agreements by decentralized (firm-level and territorial) 
bargaining. With this measure, company- and local-level agreements, named ‘proximity bargaining’, 
could legally derogate in pejorative terms not only from the industry-wide collective labour contracts 
but also from national norms. Thus, the 2011 reform made it possible to negotiate less favourable 
conditions for workers than those established by norms or sectoral contracts. The OPTC agreements 
would be effective for all workers involved, as long as these agreements were signed – based on a 
majority vote – by the most representative of the employees’ associations at the national or territorial 
levels or by their firm-level representatives (RSU or RSA). In cases of firm-level contracts, but not 
in territorial ones, the OPTC applications were conditioned by RSU or RSA approval. 
The derogations concerned the following main issues: tasks and grading of staff, the classification 
and assignment of personnel, conditions for the adoption and renewal of fixed-term contracts (FTCs) 
and the transformation and conversion of working contracts, agreements on working hours and less 
restrictive hiring and firing rules. One rationale behind the possibility of deviations on these matters 
was that these derogations could allow firms to handle temporary economic difficulties and 
uncertainties without resorting to a massive reduction in their workforce. The only constraints were 
the impossibility of derogating from norms on unfair dismissals and the mandatory compliance with 
the Constitution (D'Amuri and Giorgiantonio, 2015). 
Particular attention must be paid to conditions for the adoption of FTCs. After the mid-1990s, Italy, 
similar to many other European countries, permitted progressive liberalization by increasing the 
number of ‘objective situations’ that require positions of fixed duration or increasing the number of 
renewals of successive FTCs with the same firm and the maximum cumulative duration of FTCs 
(OECD, 2013, p.88). In Italy, these reforms are associated with the maintenance of strict regulations 
on open-ended contracts. These reforms (particularly the so-called Treu Package of 1997, the Decree 
Law 368/2001 and the Biagi Law of 2003) increased the flexibility of labour market entry not via 
radical de-regulation but re-regulating employment relationships and specifying conditions and 
circumstances for the use of non-standard forms of employment (OECD, 2009). The legal changes 
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thus allowed more opportunities but also imposing conditions for the adoption of fixed-term 
contracts, for instance, setting the maximum duration of FTCs at 36 months. In 2012, with a new 
labour market reform (the Fornero Law, n. 92), some additional restrictions were imposed. For the 
case of two separate contracts with the same employer, a mandatory interruption of at least 90 days 
since the expiry of the first contract was introduced (instead of 10-20 days as established by previous 
legislation), and restrictions of valid cases for fixed-term contracts were introduced. In addition, for 
fixed-term contracts, an increase of 1.4% of social security contributions was imposed, and this 
amount was partly recoverable only if the contract was transformed into a permanent contract. With 
opting out, firms could derogate from these norms, extending the maximum duration of fixed-term 
contracts to over 36 months, reducing the interruption to less than 90 days between two fixed-term 
contracts and reducing the social security contributions of these contracts by 1.4%.  
 
2.3 Contractual flexibility, fixed-term contracts and research questions 
More contractual flexibility allowed by OPTC could be based on internal labour flexibility 
(working hour adjustments) or external labour flexibility (increase in FTCs). For the case of Germany, 
Brändle and Heinbach (2013) examine the role of opening clauses and find that these clauses favoured 
working hour adjustments but also left job creation and destruction almost unchanged, with no 
significant effects on job growth. 
As for external flexibility, the available literature has shown that FTCs present a number of 
advantages and disadvantages (see the short review by Eichhorst, 2014), with potential opposing 
effects on net job growth. 
Concerning positive aspects, temporary contracts represent good opportunities for new entrants to 
the labour market, providing a probationary period and easing the transition from inactivity or 
education to employment, as shown by matching models (Abowd et al., 1999; Boeri, 2010). In 
addition, these contracts may be used as a buffer stock when firms face seasonal or cyclical 
fluctuations and enable them to quickly respond to recurrent changes in the state of demand (Bentolila 
and Saint Paul, 1992). Furthermore, these arrangements may serve as a screening device for the 
selection of motivated and talented employees. Workers who have initial temporary contracts but 
expect to later obtain a permanent position are motivated to commit much effort and acquire specific 
human capital to qualify for better positions. Thus, probationary posts can be “stepping stones into 
good permanent jobs” (Booth et al. 2002, p. F195). 
In terms of disadvantages, fixed-term contracts may be ‘dead ends’ rather than a pathway to a 
stable position. Indeed, these contracts are not desirable as long-term careers because they 
systematically pay less than corresponding permanent contracts and are associated with lower job 
satisfaction and less work-related training (Booth et al., 2002). In more detail, Bosio (2014) found for 
Italy that controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity reduces the wage gap between regular 
and temporary workers, but part of the wage penalty remains. Additionally, an increase in the degree 
of precariousness inside the firm can lead to a deterioration in the working environment and thus 
reduce workers’ motivation and effort (Battisti and Vallanti, 2013, p. 762). The presence of temporary 
workers, implying a lower dismissal probability for permanent workers, lessens their motivation and 
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effort. Thus, the liberalization of FTCs contributes only to the dualization of the labour market 
(Eichhorst, 2014) and creates a segment of the labour force engaged in low-quality jobs (the 
‘entrapment’ hypothesis). Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) showed that in a context where no radical 
interventions have been adopted, the liberalization of FTCs exerts only a transitional ‘honeymoon 
effect’ on net job growth. Indeed, employment increases reveal no lasting effect because when the 
stock of insiders hired on permanent contracts is phased out by natural turnover, fixed-term employees 
replace open-ended contracts. 
In our study, we expect that in the absence of a number of radical reforms, such as those 
implemented in Germany (Jacobi and Kluve, 2007) with improved active labour market policies and 
the re-organization of public employment services, opting out is only a partial measure that allows 
the firm to enjoy ‘marginal flexibility’.  
Below, we will test whether giving more flexibility to firms engaging in decentralized bargaining 
through opt-out clauses has increased their propensity to employ temporary workers. Second, we will 
investigate whether the higher flexibility allowed by opt-out clauses has induced higher job flows 
(hiring and separations), which in turn positively affects the net job turnover rate and labour 
productivity. Should the latter increase, derogations from industry-wide collective agreements can 
restore a reasonable level of flexibility. Conversely, if opt-out clauses result in more fixed-term 
contracts without significant effects on net job creation and labour productivity, it would mean that 
only a sizeable composition effect on the workforce occurred. Hence, the introduction of OPTC might 
represent a partial reform that only allows firms to gradually adjust the stock of permanent workers 
downwards (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007). 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data 
 
This study uses information obtained through an employer and employee survey (Rilevazione su 
Imprese e Lavoro, RIL) conducted by INAPP in 2011 and 2015 on a representative sample of 
partnerships and limited liability firms operating in the extra-agricultural private sector. The RIL 
survey collects a rich set of information about employment composition, personnel organization, 
industrial relations, management and other workplace characteristics. In particular, we have 
information about ownership structure and the individual management profiles (see more details 
below), which proxy for managerial practices. This information offers the great advantage of 
controlling for important sources of firm heterogeneity, as emphasized in previous literature (Bloom 
and van Reenen, 2007). 
The RIL questionnaire provides data about the existence or non-existence of a second level of 
bargaining, and each sampled firm in the RIL surveys was asked whether it had adopted a firm-level 
contract. In 2014, an additional section was inserted into the RIL questionnaire to collect information 
about opting out. Each respondent firm was asked whether it signs a firm-level agreement in 
derogation of laws and national collective contracts, as introduced by Article 8 of Law 148/2011. This 
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information permits the establishment of a policy evaluation framework (Imbens and Wooldridge, 
2009) because we can compare the outcomes of firms adopting or not adopting OPTC before and 
after the introduction of the 2011 Law. 
The dataset also contains useful firm-level information for our five dependent variables 
(outcomes): the share of FTC, the shares of new hiring and total separations3 , net job turnover, 
measured by the difference between hiring and separations over the total number of employees (which 
offers information on net job growth) and a proxy for labour productivity: the sales/employee ratio. 
As for control variables, we add information about i) management and the corporate governance 
of companies (manager education, information on family or non-family ownership and management 
of the firm), ii) workforce characteristics (occupation, gender, age, education and training) and iii) 
other firm characteristics (size, product and process innovation, exports). The presence of unions and 
employers’ associations is supplementary information within the set of other firm characteristics, in 
addition to other categorical variables describing economic activities (Nace Rev.2 aggregations of 2 
digit sectors) and regions (NUTS1). Table A.1 in the Appendix shows more detailed definitions of all 
variables used in the empirical analysis. 
The empirical analysis is performed on firms with more than 15 employees. The choice of this 
threshold is motivated by Italian legislation, which, before the introduction of the so-called Jobs Act 
on December 2014, placed more stringent regulations on firms with more than 15 employees. In our 
case, this threshold allows us to also identify those firms where the presence of Italian work councils, 
the so-called “Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie” (RSU), are established by law; these bodies are 
entitled to call general meetings and referendums and may influence collective agreements, as well 
as, at least potentially, signing opt-out clauses at the workplace. 
After imposing this selection criterion and deleting observations with missing values for the 
variables used in the empirical analysis, our final sample is approximately 2500 firms, observed in 
both 2010 and 2014. 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the RIL sample over the 2010-2014 period. Looking at 
our outcome variables, we note that the share of fixed-term contracts (FTCs) declines from 12.73% 
in 2010 to 8.54% in 2014; the declining trend in FTCs pairs with a significant reduction in both hiring 
(from 13.35% in 2010 to 9.41% in 2014) and separations (from 13.51% in 2010 to 8.95% in 2014), 
resulting in stagnant net job creation over the period under study. All these features are coherent with 
the comparative picture presented by the European Commission (2015), where Italy is described as a 
country especially hit by the sovereign debt crisis that started in 2011. Since 2011, a remarkable 
increase in the unemployment rate has transitorily reduced the propensity to employ temporary 
workers and flattened the net job creation. 
[Please Insert Table 1] 
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In addition, we observe a slight increase in performance between 2010 and 2014, as evaluated in 
our case in terms of sales per capita (from 11.70 to 11.82 in log values) and as underlined by several 
reports (see OECD, 2017b, and Bugamelli et al. 2018, among others). 
Turning our attention to management and corporate governance, Table 1 shows the low education 
levels of Italian employers (29.29% and 35.55% of firms in 2010 and 2014, respectively, are led by 
someone with a tertiary degree), a feature that may reflect the high proportion of family ownership 
(82.09% in 2010 and 75.44% in 2014) and the limited presence of managers recruited outside dynastic 
ties (5.14% in 2010 and 9.02 in 2014%). 
During the 2010-2014 period, the structure of the workforce shows a slight increase in the average 
educational endowment and in professional composition, while we observe a significant increase in 
the share of trained workers (from 25.52% in 2010 to 40.96% in 2014) and, conversely, a sharp 
reduction in ‘young’ workers who are less than 35 years old (from 32.61% in 2010 to 24.49% in 
2014). 
The average incidence of unionized firms increased from 30.92% to 38.95%, while firms 
belonging to an employer’s association slightly increased from 68.58% to 70.99%. 
Concerning firm strategies, the number of Italian firms that weathered the crisis by relying on 
international markets increased, showing the potential role of the increase in the number of exporting 
firms from 2010 to 2014 as a strategic response to compensate for the contraction of domestic 
demand. This strategy may partly explain the slight increase in performance observed in the same 
period (see outcome variables). Finally, the geographical location shows the higher number of firms 
operating in the northern part of Italy (to save space and improve the readability of the table, we do 
not show the distribution of firms across sectors. These results are available upon request.) 
A more detailed descriptive analysis is shown in Table 2, which reports separate summary statistics 
for two distinct groups of firms, i.e., firms that in 2014 declared to have adopted (OPTC) or to have 
not adopted (NO-OPTC) opt-out clauses after 20114. Column Diff reports the significance levels of 
the differences between the means of these two categories of firms. The last row of this table shows 
that 192 OPTC firms (approximately 8% of the total sample) entered the group of treated firms. 
[Please Insert Table 2] 
The comparison shows that in 2010, the OPTC firms featured some specific traits. These firms 
were significantly more unionized and recorded, with respect to NO-OPTC firms, a lower incidence 
of FTC (9.81% vs. 12.83%), which is likely due to the opposition of unions to this type of contract. 
Notice that in 2010, OPTC firms also presented lower inflows with respect to NO-OPTC firms (their 
hiring was 9.76% vs. 13.48%) and not statistically significantly lower outflows (their separations 
were 11.85% vs. 13.57%). Concerning net labour turnover, we observe a negative balance for OPTC 
firms (-2.09%), which is significantly lower with respect to the positive value for NO-OPTC firms (+ 
0,04). Table 2 also shows, at least at a first sight, that after the adoption of OPTC, these firms restored 
some degree of flexibility, which enabled them to avoid job losses (the net turnover that was negative 
in 2010 was approximately nil in 2014) without adopting a higher share of fixed-term contracts, which 
remained almost stable in OPTC firms. Notice, in any case, that the p-values of t-tests of differences 
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between means, distinct by status, signal that in 2014, for our outcome variables there were no more 
significant differences between OPTC and NO-OPTC firms.  
Interestingly, concerning the climate of industrial relations, we observe an overall increase in 
unionization. This change is much higher, from 77.09% to 91.80% between 2010 and 2014, in OPTC 
firms and particularly meaningful, as the decision to deviate from sectoral agreements and norms 
requires, by the 148/2011 Law, the approval of RSUs or RSAs. This condition, as stated above, is 
compulsory at least in firm-level agreements, which represent 91.80% of decentralized bargaining, 
whereas only in territorial contracts (a small fraction) are derogations possible without the approval 
of firm-level worker representatives. 
Table A.2 in the Appendix shows additional features of the Italian labour bargaining system. These 
statistics do not enter the econometric analysis and are intended only to integrate the discussion of 
the institutional setting. From Table A.2, we observe that more than 90% of both OPTC and NO-
OPTC firms adopted a sector-wide agreement (first-level bargaining) between 2010 and 2014. The 
second-level bargaining occurred mainly at the firm level and involved 13.7-14.9% of NO-OPTC 
firms. In conformity with bargaining rules, all firms that adopted an opt-out agreement in 2014 
introduced this clause in a second-level contract. For this group of firms, the percentage of firms 
involved in territorial-level agreements, which are a type of second-level bargaining, was slightly less 
than 9%. The p-value tests indicate that in both years, OPTC firms were more unionized and more 
involved in first-level, firm-level and territorial-level bargaining with respect to NO-OPTC firms. 
Finally, notice that the presence of OPTC firms that are not unionized is explained by the fact that in 
territorial contracts, as said in section 2.2, a small fraction are derogations possible without the 
approval of firm-level worker representatives. 
From descriptive statistics, one can be tempted to assess the beneficial impacts associated with 
contractual deviations (OPTC) obtained in terms of job flows. However, many confounding factors 
may be behind these results because, from Table 2, one can also observe that OPTC firms are 
substantially different from their NO-OPTC counterparts. In particular, the large heterogeneity we 
observe among the covariate distributions at baseline (that is, in 2010) may be an important source of 
selection bias. Indeed, OPTC firms have a more qualified management and workforce and adopt more 
active strategies in terms of orientation to foreign markets, training and innovation. In addition, in 
2010, the proportion of OPTC firms owned or controlled by families was approximately half of that 
observed in the NO-OPTC group (47.1% vs. 83.3%), and the share of firms with outside managers 
(instead of dynastic managers) was approximately three times that found among NO-OPTC firms. 
Note also that OPTC firms showed a higher percentage of executives (in 2010 8% vs. 3.9%), had 
more intense training activities (33% vs. 25.3 %) and were more frequently under the leadership of 
management with high educational degrees (57.4% vs. 28.3%). Finally, these enterprises were more 
exposed to international competition as exporters (53.4% vs. 38.2%) and more active in terms of 
innovation (77.2% vs. 62.7%). All these differences in characteristics between OPTC and NO-OPTC 
firms are statistically significant, as shown by the p-values of difference between means (column 
Diff). They raise concerns about the randomization with which firms adopted opt-out clauses and call 
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for econometric methods that complement the conventional ones to test the robustness of results and 
reduce the potential selection bias. 
 
 
4. Econometric analysis 
4.1 Methods 
The descriptive statistics summarized above can form the basis of a more thorough investigation 
into the role of opt-out clauses. The first step of the econometric analysis is based on a simple linear 
relationship specified as follows: 
  𝑌𝑖,𝑡   = 𝛼 + 𝛽 ∙ 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜸 ∙ 𝑴𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝀 ∙ 𝑭𝑪𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑡 + 𝜇𝒔 + 𝜗𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
 
 
t=[2010,2014]; i=[1,…4,869] 
 
where Yit indicates, alternatively, for each i-th firm, one of the following dependent variables: i) 
the share of fixed-term contracts (FTC); ii) the share of new hiring; iii) the share of total separations, 
which includes layoffs, retirements and voluntary separations; iv) the net job turnover; and v) the 
sales per capita. Our key explanatory variable, OPTCi,t, is a dummy variable indicating whether the i-
th firm adopts an opt-out clause, i.e., deviations in firm-level agreements from sectoral collective 
agreements. The vectors MCi,t, WCi,t, and FCi,t include controls for management, workforce and other 
firm characteristics, respectively. All these covariates have already been discussed in Tables 1 and 2 
(for more details on their construction, see also Table A.1 in the Appendix)5. Furthermore, t  is a time 
dummy taking a value of 1 in 2014; μs captures sector-specific effects, while 𝝑 r controls for regional 
(NUTS1 level) effects. Finally, εi,t is the error term capturing the idiosyncratic component of the 
dependent variable. 
To test the research question discussed above, equation (1) is preliminarily estimated by 
performing a standard pooled OLS regression. However, the OLS strategy is not suitable to control 
for potential unobserved heterogeneity, i.e., those time-invariant firm-specific characteristics that 
might “confound” the impact of the variable OPTCi,t on our dependent variables. Hence, we take 
advantage of the panel structure of the RIL data and circumvent the omitted variable biases by 
performing fixed effect estimates (FE). Unfortunately, our data contain only two years, and thus, the 
variability within firms of many explanatory variables is limited (Wooldridge, 2010). However, we 
can exploit the availability of our panel data (2010, 2014), given that the policy change occurred in 
this interval (in 2011), thus allowing the adoption of a policy evaluation framework by means of the 
difference-in-differences (Diff-in-Diff) estimator. 
We identified treatment and control groups. That is, we exploit (i) the existence of data for the pre- 
and post-policy change periods and (ii) the availability of a rich set of covariates that control for 
observable characteristics of the firms included in the longitudinal component of our sample. We 
assign to our treatment group those firms declaring in 2014 to have adopted an opt-out clause as a 
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consequence of the introduction of Article 8, Law 148/2011. For the non-experimental control group, 
we consider all firms that did not adopt an opt-out clause examined before and after the reform. In 
other words, to reduce self-selection bias, we compare treated firms (OPTC=1) and control firms 
(OPTC=0) at the baseline (2010) and endpoint (2014). Thus, the second step of our econometric 
analysis implies the following Diff-in-Diff specification: 
 𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶   = 𝛼𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶 + 𝛽1 ∙ 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∙ 𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶𝑖 ∙ 𝑡 + 𝜸 ∙ 𝑴𝑪𝒊,𝒕,𝑶𝑷𝑻𝑪 + 𝜹 ∙ 𝑾𝑪𝒊,𝒕,𝑶𝑷𝑻𝑪 + +𝝀 ∙ 𝑭𝑪𝒊,𝒕,𝑶𝑷𝑻𝑪 + 𝜇𝒔,𝑶𝑷𝑻𝑪 + 𝜗𝑟,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶      (2) 
t=[2010,2014]; i=[1,…4,869] 
 
where the subscript OPTC indicates that we estimate over time (2010 and 2014) the parameters of 
interest for treated (OPTC=1) and control firms (OPTC=0). 
It is worth noting that the Diff-in-Diff impact is the parameter β3 of the interaction term OPTCi ∙ t. 
 
4.2 Identification assumptions 
The identification of an unbiased coefficient 𝛽  for OPTC in the panel data fixed effects 
specification of equation (1) relies on the crucial assumption of time-constant unobserved firm-level 
characteristics (Wooldridge, 2010). However, it could still be possible that unobserved characteristics 
are time-varying factors. We use a very large set of covariates that control for many potential 
confounders – not only exports and innovation performance but also a number of workforce 
characteristics – corporate governance aspects, and managerial traits, among others. If unobserved 
time-varying factors exist and are correlated at the same time with OPTC and our dependent variables, 
the fixed effects specification for OPTC in equation (1) would be biased, which means that we can 
observe OPTC adopting different hiring and firing strategies simply because these firms experienced 
a number of period-specific changes and not because they opted out of collective agreements. In this 
case the 𝛽 parameter does not identify a casual effect.   
Unfortunately, discovering external sources and instruments to restore the randomization of OPTC 
is a very difficult task. Instead, as we did in equation (2), the two-period structure of our panel data 
allows us to set up a Diff-in-Diff specification. This alternative strategy is not free from troubles and 
relies on important assumptions, which we discuss below. 
The Diff-in-Diff impact of equation (2) is identified by subtracting the pre-existing differences 
between treatment and control groups at the baseline from the mean difference in these groups at the 
endpoint: (𝑌𝑖,2014,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶=1  − 𝑌𝑖,2014,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶=0) −  (𝑌𝑖,2010,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶=1  − 𝑌𝑖,2010,𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐶=0) = 𝜷3 (3) 
 
The first crucial assumption for the Diff-in-Diff impact 𝜷3 being unbiased is the so-called common 
trend assumption (CTA), which means that we should observe parallel trends in the outcomes of 
treated and control units in the absence of the treatment (that is, the introduction of Article 8, Law 
148/2011). If the CTA holds, the Diff-in-Diff estimator has the advantage, compared to the fixed 
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effects estimator, of removing any common period effects that influence the treatment and control 
groups in identical ways (see Gebel and Voßemer, 2014). The limited longitudinal structure of our 
data (only two years) makes it impossible to directly test the CTA. However, to make the CTA more 
plausible, we performed a kernel-based propensity score Diff-in-Diff, KPS_DID (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983; Heckman et al., 1997, 1998; Gebel and Voßemer, 2014). Through the KPS_DID, we 
first measure the probability of adopting an opt-out clause conditional on the large set of covariates 
proposed above. These different probabilities enter the Diff-in-Diff estimation of equation (2) as 
weights that give different importance to the control firms in order to properly approximate the 
counterfactual, that is, the values of the outcome variables that opting out firms would have shown if 
they had not opted out. Although the kernel propensity score does not rule out potential biases 
stemming from unobservables, this procedure allows us to compare, as much as possible, treated and 
control firms as statistical twins (Gebel and Voßemer, 2014) so that they have common support. We 
can test the effectiveness of the kernel propensity score in guaranteeing the so-called common support 
condition. This test (see Table A.3 in the Appendix) allowed us to determine whether the propensity 
score method is useful for reducing heterogeneities between the treated and control groups before the 
treatment. 
The second crucial assumption underlying our Diff-in-Diff strategy is that all potential biases rely 
on selection on observables. In other words, we assume that our set of covariates is large enough to 
include all factors determining the self-selection of firms in the OPTC status. Indeed, adding proxies 
of managerial capabilities and corporate governance to the standard controls for firm and workforce 
characteristics should make the selection on observables assumption less difficult to accept because, 
in most recent literature, both the management and governance traits of the firm are viewed as 
important sources of unobserved heterogeneity (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007; Berrone et al., 2012). 
That said, we are aware that the estimated effect of opting out on labour outcomes might still suffer 
from endogeneity problems because OPTC may be correlated with different pre-reform trends that 
we cannot directly observe. Using the KPS_DID approach is the best we can do given the data we 
have, that is, a two-year panel data sample. For this reason, we will discuss the econometric results 
with due caution and avoid interpreting them in terms of a causal effect of OPTC on our five labour 
outcomes. 
 
4.3 Results 
 
Table 3 reports the pooled OLS results6. Focusing on the contractual arrangements, we note that 
the application of opt-out clauses is associated with an increase in the FTC share (+2.8 percentage 
points, p.p. hereinafter) that is significant at the 1 per cent level. 
[Please Insert Table 3] 
From the other columns of Table 3, it is also interesting to compare the positive and significant 
coefficients associated with new hiring (+4.2 p.p.) and separations (+3.0 p.p.). The result for net 
turnover, which are not significantly different from 0, suggests that the adoption of an opt-out clause 
does not encourage the creation of new jobs. In addition, our estimates show that the productivity 
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gains (8.5%) associated with OPTC are not significantly different from 0 (see the fifth column of 
Table 3). From these preliminary results, taken as a whole, it is plausible to conjecture that deviations 
from collective sectoral agreements have represented a way for Italian firms to obtain more flexibility 
in staff composition and have allowed them to substitute permanent with temporary contracts, 
whereas the additional new entrants in their workforce compensate only for the number of exits. This 
higher labour mobility, however, does not seem to foster substantial productivity gains. 
As expected, we obtain the results above in a context in which unions contrast with labour mobility 
(-1.9 p.p. the hiring rate and -0.9 the net job turnover) and seem to oppose FTCs (-3.6 p.p.), likely 
because temporary workers represent a threat to union bargaining power (Devicienti et al. 2018; 
Salvatori, 2012). In addition, after the outbreak of the sovereign debt crisis in Italy (see the 
coefficients for year 2014 in Table 3), the share of FTCs slightly declined (-0.7 p.p.) and overall 
labour hoarding negatively affected both hiring (-1.6 p.p.) and separation rates (-1.9 p.p.). If we bear 
in mind that retirements are included in the separation rate, it is plausible to assume that the negative 
effect on the separation rates is likely due to the pension reform launched in December 2011 (Law 
214/11), which notably increased the average retirement age (Borella and Coda Moscarola, 2015). As 
a consequence of this reform, the overall labour hoarding is also signalled by the increase in training 
activities after 2011 (Berton et al., 2017). 
Interestingly, improvements in labour productivity (see the coefficients for ln sales per capita in the 
first three columns of Table 3) appear to be negatively associated with these job flows, mainly 
supported by the propensity to employ temporary workers. 
We notice, however, that previous results obtained from pooled OLS regressions may be 
misleading when the introduction of a set of explanatory variables is not sufficient to circumvent 
potential omitted variable biases due to the time-invariant unobserved characteristics. We address this 
issue with fixed effect estimates (FE) of equation (1). The results of the FE estimates (Table 4) 
substantially confirm the previous findings, even though both the magnitude and the significance of 
the impact of OPTC on the dependent variables describing labour mobility (hiring, separations and 
net job turnover) become slightly smaller. Table 4 indicates that the adoption of OPTC is associated 
with an increase in FTC (+1.6 p.p.), while the positive estimates for total hiring (+2.7 p.p.) and 
separations (2.5 p.p.) seem to substantially offset each other, so that no significant influences on net 
job turnover have been estimated. Again, OPTC does not seem to improve labour productivity, and 
results concerning the covariates are largely coherent with those discussed in Table 3. Thus, fixed 
effects estimates suggest that once the potential time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is taken into 
account, no excessive biases for the OPTC coefficients emerge in comparison with the pooled OLS 
estimates (Table 3). 
[Please Insert Table 4] 
Other important concerns might strongly affect the results above, and further robustness checks are 
needed. First, using a within estimator for only two years does not guarantee sufficient variability in 
the data and consistent estimations. Instead, given that the policy change occurs between 2010 and 
2014, a Diff-in-Diff specification seems to be much better suited. Moreover, as discussed in section 
4.1, we know from the descriptive statistics (see Table 2) that firms adopting an opt-out clause after 
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the introduction of Law 148/2011 are different with respect to those that did not. In econometric 
terms, this large imbalance in the characteristics of treated and control firms boosts the risk of self-
selection bias even in the case of Diff-in-Diff because it undermines the validity of the common trend 
assumption. To reduce this risk, we combine the Diff-in-Diff and the propensity score matching 
(KPS_DID), thus adjusting both the dependent and the other observable variables for pre-treatment 
(pre-reform). Table A.3, in the Appendix, shows the results for the common support condition test. 
Indeed, after calculating a kernel propensity score, we obtain very similar conditions at the baseline 
(2010) for the control and treated groups, as differences in means are no longer statistically significant 
for almost all variables. 
The final results for the KPS_DID after imposing the common support condition are reported in 
Table 5. For each outcome, this table shows the differences between treated and control group 
averages before and after the introduction of the 148/11 Law and the final Diff-in-Diff impact; the 
p_values inform us of their statistical significance (for this analysis, we used the Stata routine Diff). 
[Please Insert Table 5] 
On the whole, we can say that the findings previously obtained with pooled OLS and FE estimates 
are largely confirmed. In particular, if we pair firms with the same characteristics, we find that the 
OPTC firms did not employ more temporary workers than their peers before the introduction of the 
148/2011 Law, i.e., 8.2% vs. 7.6%, respectively, and the 0.6 p.p. difference is not statistically 
significant. In contrast, in the follow up, firms derogating from the collective bargaining rules 
increased the share of FTC to 9.0%, whereas control firms reduced the employment for this category 
of workers to 6.5% of total employees; thus, the 2.5 p.p. difference in 2014 is statistically significant. 
Overall, OPTC firms significantly increased their share of temporary workers between 2010 and 2014 
by 1.9, p.p. and this Diff-in Diff is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
We find very similar results for the Diff-in-Diff impact in the separation rates, which significantly 
increased by 2.2 p.p. and hiring rates (+2.4 p.p.); all these coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level. 
However, there was no significant difference in net job creation (Table 5, column NJT) between the 
treated and control groups either before or after the introduction of the 148/2011 Law. Thus, consistent 
with the previous results, the Diff-in-Diff impact (0.3) was not significantly different from 0. Finally, 
our estimation also shows no significant benefits in terms of productivity for firms that deviated from 
the collective bargaining systems (the 0.075 difference in log points is not statistically significant).  
 
4. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we study the impact of opt-out clauses on firms’ hiring policies, adoption of fixed-
term contracts and labour productivity in the Italian economy. The 148/2011 Law established for the 
first time the possibility for firms to derogate in pejorative terms not only from industry-wide 
collective labour contracts but also from national norms. Because we observe Italian firms before and 
after the introduction of the 2011 Law, we can analyse the impact of this measure within a policy 
evaluation framework. After we control for a wide set of confounding factors, we find that adopting 
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an opt-out clause notably increases job flows, as both hiring and separations grow. These positive 
impacts on hiring and exit balance out, without significant variations in terms of net employment. In 
addition, no significant labour productivity gains are obtained by firms that deviate from collective 
bargaining rules. The only significant change we find concerns the composition of the workforce, as 
in OPTC firms, the share of temporary workers rises. These results are obtained with econometric 
methods, such as fixed effects and Diff-in-Diff combined with the propensity score, which try to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity and self-selection issues. 
These imperfect methods are complementary and suggest consistent results, although our data do 
not allow us to adopt other estimation strategies to ascertain a causal nexus between opting-out and 
the labour market indicators under study. In any case, we believe that providing new empirical 
evidence on an important and still under-explored issue in the current debate on collective bargaining 
remains an important value added of this study.  
To better appreciate the meaning and scope of our results, let us compare our findings with those 
obtained in other studies for Germany, a country for which the literature on opt-out practices has 
flourished in the last few years. In Germany, the deviations from collective sectoral agreements and 
the apparent de-institutionalization of industrial relations contributed to a re-institutionalization and 
to the formation of ‘local alliances’ between firm actors, management and employee representation 
(Haipeter, 2011; Fitzenberger et al. 2013). The German case, as noted by Visser (2016, p. 20), is “an 
illustration of how something that began as a temporary local solution for firms to survive and for 
employees to rescue their jobs can become institutionalized as a permanent extra layer in collective 
bargaining.” 
In Italy, on the contrary, enterprises have been unable to adopt opting out to obtain heterogeneous 
compensation strategies and ensure a flexible adaptation process to the same underlying market forces 
faced by German firms, such as globalization and technological changes (Devicienti et al. 2019). In 
the Italian context, the process of negotiating firm-level contracts, which set lower standards than 
those adopted by sector-level agreements, merely signals the progressive erosion of the protective 
function of collective bargaining. Our results suggest the inefficacy of derogation practices in 
expanding opportunities for workers, likely because neither labour market entrants nor existing 
workers benefit from concessions in terms of opening vacancies, skill acquisition and job protection. 
Rather than being a “safety valve” (Visser, 2016, p.32), opting out represents an escape towards more 
flexible labour arrangements, such as fixed-term contracts. In this process, the room to manoeuvre 
for the mobilization of workers and their representatives in demanding high-road innovation 
strategies through concessionary bargaining is severely restricted. These results are highly relevant 
for current policy discussions.  
After the 2018 approval of more restrictive regulations on non-standard employment (see the 
Dignity Decree, 12/7/218, n.87), contractual deviations from these new regulatory constraints are 
currently seen as a strategy to weather the prolonged period of economic stagnation. However, our 
findings may inform policy makers who promoted opt-out clauses to mitigate the decline in the 
number of jobs of the unexpected and disappointing results of these derogations. 
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Finally, it must be noted that in a global context where higher transaction costs, increased 
inequalities and the risk of automation for individual jobs depict the prospective scenario, the 
effectiveness of collective bargaining “requires adapting it to the changing challenges and finding the 
right balance between inclusiveness and flexibility” (OECD, 2017a, p.165). However, if inclusiveness 
can be achieved through centralized or sectoral agreements and high bargaining coverage, substantial 
flexibility gained in individual firms through opt-out practices does not always drive firms towards a 
‘high road’ in terms of innovation and training but rather may steer them towards worsening labour 
standards and lower productivity, as the Italian case suggests. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics by year (whole sample) 
 2010 2014 Pooled sample 
 Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Outcome variables       
Fixed-term contracts 12.73 18.41 8.54 14.62 11.09 17.15 
Hires 13.35 21.39 9.41 16.71 11.81 19.78 
Separations 13.51 21.13 8.95 16.11 11.73 19.45 
Net job turnover -0.03 13.84 0.46 12.87 0.16 13.47 
ln (Sales per capita)* 11.70 1.28 11.82 1.27 11.74 1.27 
Management characteristics       
Tertiary ed. 29.29  35.55  31.74  
Upper secondary ed. 51.60  47.01  49.81  
Lower secondary and primary ed. 19.11  17.44  18.46  
Family firms 82.09  75.44  79.50  
External management 5.14  9.02  6.66  
Workforce characteristics       
Tertiary ed. 9.17 16.61 11.08 17.72 9.91 17.08 
Upper secondary ed. 41.42 26.71 45.02 26.47 42.83 26.67 
Lower secondary and primary ed. 49.42 31.16 43.90 30.34 47.26 30.96 
Trained 25.52 35.38 40.96 40.74 31.56 38.31 
Aged<35 32.61 21.41 24.49 19.99 29.44 21.24 
Executives 4.06 7.58 4.16 8.17 4.10 7.81 
White collar 33.58 28.11 35.84 28.00 34.47 28.09 
Blue collar 62.36 30.87 59.99 30.59 61.43 30.78 
Women 33.46 26.02 33.37 26.36 33.43 26.15 
Firm characteristics       
Unions 30.92  38.95  34.06  
Employers' association 68.58  70.99  69.53  
Export 38.76  46.38  41.74  
Innovation 63.20  56.65  60.64  
Firm age 26.05 18.63 29.84 20.89 28.15 20.71 
ln (Employees) 3.48 0.78 4.33 1.11 3.44 0.75 
Northwest 33.61  41.86  36.84  
Northeast 30.83  33.67  31.94  
Centre 18.28  13.79  16.52  
South 17.29  10.68  14.70  
    
 Obs. 2,750 2,427 5,177 
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014. Note: sampling weights applied. All values are 
percentages with the exception of ln (Sales per capita), firm age and ln (Employees). 
Standard deviation is not reported for binary variables. * Statistics on ln (Sales per capita) 
are based on 4,869 observations in the pooled sample. Economic activities (sectors) not 
reported due to space limitations. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics by year (OPTC and NO-OPTC firms) 
 
2010 
  
2014 
 OPTC =0 OPTC =1 Diff OPTC =0 OPTC =1 Diff 
  Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev OPTC-NO-OPTC Mean* Std Dev Mean* Std Dev OPTC-NO-OPTC 
Outcome variables 
   
  
     
Fixed-term contracts 12.83 18.52 9.81 14.76 -3.02* 8.5 14.66 9.36 13.61 0.86 
Hires 13.48 21.49 9.76 17.98 -3.72** 9.34 16.73 11.21 16.1 1.87 
Separations 13.57 21.25 11.85 17.33 -1.72 8.88 16.11 10.61 15.91 1.73 
Net job turnover 0.04 14.01 -2.09 7.09 -2.13** 0.46 12.91 0.57 11.99 0.11 
ln (Sales per capita) 11.70 1.27 11.75 1.4 0.05 11.8 1.25 12.14 1.55 0.34 
Management characteristics 
   
  
     
Tertiary ed. 28.28  57.39  29.11*** 34.35  65.44  31.09*** 
Upper secondary ed. 52.27  33.08  -19.19*** 47.8  27.36  -20.44*** 
Lower secondary  
19.45  9.53  -9.92** 17.85  7.21  -10.64*** 
and primary ed. 
Family firms 83.35  47.07  -36.28*** 76.63  45.54  -31.09*** 
External management 4.81  14.49  9.68*** 8.62  18.91  10.29* 
Workforce characteristics           
Tertiary ed. 8.87 16.4 17.32 20.02 8.45*** 10.8 17.5 18.14 21.34 7.34*** 
Upper secondary ed. 41.41 26.88 41.48 21.3 0.07 44.94 26.57 46.92 23.88 1.98 
Lower secondary  
49.71 31.18 41.19 29.44 -8.52** 44.26 30.37 34.94 28.21 -9.32** 
and primary ed. 
Trained 25.25 35.29 32.98 37.03 7.73* 40.54 40.63 51.51 41.96 10.97* 
Aged<35  32.78 21.54 27.87 16.82 -4.91** 24.73 20.16 18.67 13.72 -6.06*** 
Executives 3.92 7.42 7.96 10.4 4.04*** 4.05 8.05 6.95 10.38 2.9** 
White collar 33.3 28.04 41.47 28.91 8.17** 35.37 27.68 47.51 33.05 12.14* 
Blue collar 62.78 30.69 50.57 33.46 -12.21*** 60.57 30.25 45.53 35.19 -15.04** 
Women 33.34 26.07 37.01 24.42 3.67 33.35 26.44 33.97 24.35 0.62 
Firm characteristics           
Unions 29.26  77.09  47.83*** 36.82  91.8  54.98*** 
Employers' association 67.85  89.02  21.17*** 70.07  93.87  23.8*** 
Export 38.24  53.41  15.17*** 46.74  37.65  -9.09*** 
Innovation 62.7  77.2  14.5*** 56.75  54.14  -2.61 
Firms age 25.91 18.63 29.84 20.89 3.93* 28.15 20.71 34.29 18.6 6.14* 
ln (Employees) 3.45 0.78 4.33 1.11 0.88 3.44 0.75 4.37 1.45 0.93 
Northwest 33.75  29.86  -3.89 41.99  38.7  -3.29 
Northeast 30.54  38.72  8.18 33.84  29.39  -4.45 
Centre 18.23  19.52  1.29 13.78  14  0.22 
South 17.48  11.9  -5.58 10.39  17.91  7.52 
Observations  2,558 192   2,235 192   
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014. Note: sampling weights applied. OPTC is the opting out clause. All values are percentages, with the exception 
of ln (Sales per capita), firms age and ln (Employees). Standard deviation is not reported for binary variables. * Statistics on ln (Sales per capita) are 
based on 4,869 observations in the pooled sample. Economic activities (sectors) not reported due to space limitations. Diff reports significance levels 
for the t-test of the difference between means: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3: Opting out clause, labour market outcomes and productivity (Pooled OLS) 
 
                FT share Hir.rate Sep.rate    NJT Ln (sales p.c.) 
    
OPTC 0.028*** 0.042*** 0.030** 0.011 0.085 
 [0.011] [0.014] [0.015] [0.009] [0.108] 
Unions -0.036*** -0.019*** -0.010 -0.009** -0.098** 
 [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.047] 
Employers' membership 0.003 -0.007 0.005 -0.014*** 0.066 
 [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] [0.045] 
Year 2014 -0.007** -0.016*** -0.019***   0.001 -0.032 
 [0.003] [0.004]    [0.005]    [0.004] [0.035] 
Ln (sales p.c.) -0.007*** -0.004*   -0.006***     0.002  
 [0.002] [0.002]     [0.002]    [0.001]  
Management characteristics Yes Yes       Yes       Yes Yes 
Workforce characteristics Yes Yes       Yes       Yes Yes 
Other firm characteristics Yes Yes       Yes       Yes Yes 
Constant -0.055** -0.024 0.024** -0.044** 13.957*** 
 [0.020] [0.047] [0.010] [0.021] [0.326] 
Observations  4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 
R2 0.189 0.135 0.095 0.023 0.146 
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014. Notes: Hir.rate=hiring rate; Sep.rate=separation rate; NJT=net job turnover. 
Management characteristics include education of managers, family firms and external management dummies; 
Workforce characteristics include education, occupation, gender, age and training of workers; Other firm 
characteristics include export, innovation, firm age, firm size, region (NUTS1) and economic activity (sectors); see 
Tables 1,2 and A.1 for more details. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: Opting out clause, labour market outcomes and productivity (FE) 
 FT share Hir.rate Sep.rate NJT Ln (sales per cap.) 
      
OPTC 0.016* 0.027** 0.025* 0.003 0.064 
 [0.009] [0.013] [0.014] [0.011] [0.120] 
Unions -0.016** -0.009 0.004 -0.012 -0.157*   
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.012] [0.011] [0.084] 
Employers' membership -0.011 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.063 
 [0.008] [0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.077] 
Year 2014 -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.018*** 0.001 -0.004 
 [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.038] 
ln (sales per cap.) -0.004** 0.001 0.001 0.000                 
 [0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]                 
Management characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Workforce characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Other firm characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -0.351*** -0.156 0.16 -0.294** 12.277*** 
 [0.107] [0.166] [0.168] [0.131] [0.891] 
 
     
Observations  4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 
R2 0.103 0.031 0.030 0.046 0.008 
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014. Notes: Hir.rate=hiring rate; Sep.rate=separation rate; NJT=net job turnover. 
Management characteristics include education of managers, family firms and external management dummies; 
Workforce characteristics include education, occupation, gender, age and training of workers; Other firm characteristics 
include export, innovation, firm age, firm size, region (NUTS1) and economic activity (sectors); see Tables 1,2 and A.1 
for more details. Clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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Table 5: Opting out clause, labour market outcomes and productivity (Diff-in-Diff with propensity score matching) 
  
 
FT share  P>|t| Hir.rate  P>|t| Sep.rate  P>|t| NJT  P>|t| Ln (sal. per 
cap.)  P>|t| 
           
Before       
 
     
 
     
 
     
  
Control 0.076  0.098  0.110  -0.010  11.980  
Treated 0.082  0.111  0.119  -0.008  11.999  
Diff (T-C) 0.006 0.260 0.013 0.050** 0.009 0.171 0.002 0.514 0.019 0.721 
After               
Control 0.065  0.079   0.085   -0.005   12.001   
Treated 0.090  0.116   0.116   0.000   12.077   
Diff (T-C) 0.025 0.000*** 0.037 0.000*** 0.032 0.000*** 0.005 0.178 0.075 0.192 
 
          
Diff-in-Diff 0.019 0.009*** 0.024 0.011** 0.022 0.019** 0.003 0.613 0.075 0.476 
Observations  4869 4869 4869 4869 4869 
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014. Notes: Hir.rate=hiring rate; Sep.rate=separation rate; NJT=net job turnover; Control=OPTC=0; Treated=OPTC=1. 
Before=2010; After=2014. As specified in equation (2) all management, workforce and firm characteristics have been included in the model; see Tables 
1,2 and A.1 for more details about these covariates. P>|t| = p_values; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A 1 Firm-level variables: definitions 
Outcome variables   
Fixed-term contracts Share of temporary workers on total employees (t.e.)  
Hires Share of newly hired employees on t.e.  
Separations Share of lay-offs, retirements and voluntary separations on t.e.  
Net job turnover Hires minus separations on t.e.  
ln (Sales per capita) (Log of) total firm sales per employee.  
Key variable   
Opting out clause (OPTC) 
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the firm has signed an opt out clause in 
derogation of the law and of the national collective contracts (CCNL), as introduced 
by Article 8 of Decree Law 148/2011, 0 otherwise  
 
 Management characteristics   
Tertiary ed. Dummy variable that equals 1 if the employer/manager who runs the firm has a tertiary level of education, 0 otherwise  
Upper secondary ed. Dummy variable that equals 1 if the employer/manager who runs the firm has an 
upper secondary level of education, 0 otherwise  
Lower sec. and prim. ed. Dummy variable that equals 1 if the employer/manager who runs the firm has a lower secondary or primary level of education, 0 otherwise  
Family firms Dummy variable that equals 1 if the ownership of the firm is held by a family, 0 
otherwise  
External management Dummy variables equal to 1 if managers who run the firms are recruited outside family ownership  
 Workforce characteristics  
Tertiary ed. Share of employees with a tertiary education  
Upper secondary ed. Share of employees with upper secondary education  
Lower sec. and prim. ed. Share of employees with lower secondary and primary education  
Aged<35 Share of employees less than 35 years old  
Trained Share of trained employees 
Women Share of female workers on t.e. 
Professional composition Share of executives, share of white-collar workers and share of blue-collar workers  
Firms characteristics  
Unions Dummy variable that equals 1 if trade unions are found at workplace, 0 otherwise 
Employers' association Dummy variable that equals 1 if firms belong to an employer’s association (i.e., Confindustria), 0 otherwise 
Innovation Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has invested in product or process innovation three years before the survey, 0 otherwise 
Foreign markets Dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm sells its products or services on foreign 
markets, 0 otherwise 
Firm age Age of the firm in years 
ln (Employees)  Total number of employees (taken in log) as proxy of firm size 
Regions  4 dummy variables for northwest, northeast, centre, south 
Sectors (Economic activity) 9 dummy variables for aggregations of Nace_Rev.2 2_digit sectors: 
 
 1) Mining & Quarrying and public utilities (Electricity, Gas, Water Distribution); 2) 
Light Manufacturing (Food, Beverages, Tobacco, Textile, Garments and Leather 
Products; Wood and Paper, Furniture; Other Light Manufacturing); 3) Heavy 
Manufacturing (Chemistry, Pharmaceutical Products, Plastic and Rubber, Coke and 
Refined Petroleum, Non-metallic Products, Metallurgy); 4) Computer, Machinery 
and Electrical Equipment; 5) Construction; 6) Retail and Wholesale Trade, Tourism, 
Hotels and Restaurants; 7) Transportation and Communication; 8) Finance, 
Intermediation and Other Business Services; 9) Healthcare, Educational and Social 
Services. 
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014 
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Table A.2 The Italian two-tier bargaining system  
 2010 2014 
 OPTC=0 OPTC=1 Diff=OPTC- NO-OPTC OPTC=0 OPTC=1 
Diff=OPTC-
NO-OPTC 
I level bargaining 97 100 3.0*** 93.4 98.3 4.9*** 
Trade union (RSU/RSA) 29.3 77.1 47.8*** 36.8 91.8 55*** 
II level bargaIning 13.7 71.5 57.8*** 14.9 100 85.1*** 
II level bargaining: firm level 10.8 65.2 54.4*** 13.6 94.5 80.9*** 
II level bargaining: territorial 
level 3.1 9.4 6.3** 1.5 8.8 7.3** 
Observations 2,558 192  2,235 192  
Source: panel component RIL 2010-2014. Sampling weights applied. All values report percentages of firms with 
a given characteristics out of the respective number of total observations. Diff reports significance levels for t-test 
of difference between means: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table A.3 Baseline balance test for outcomes and covariates used in the Diff-in-Diff with propensity 
score matching 
Variables Control (Mean) Treated (Mean) Diff. t Pr(T>t) 
Outcome variables     
Fixed term contracts 7.60 8.20 0.60 1.18 0.239 
Hires 9.80 11.10 1.30 1.9 0.057* 
Separations 11.00 11.90 0.90 1.35 0.176 
Net job turnover -1.00 -0.80 0.20 0.72 0.473 
ln (Sales per capita) 11.96 11.99 0.04 0.76 0.449 
Management characteristics     
Tertiary ed. 64.30 64.90 0.70 0.36 0.720 
Upper secondary ed. 29.00 28.30 -0.80 0.44 0.660 
Family firms 36.90 35.60 -1.30 0.69 0.490 
External management 25.20 26.70 1.50 0.86 0.389 
Workforce characteristics     
Tertiary ed. 16.70 17.10 0.40 0.61 0.542 
Upper secondary ed. 42.50 43.10 0.60 0.7 0.486 
Trained 41.60 42.90 1.30 0.88 0.379 
Aged<35 25.90 25.40 -0.50 0.73 0.465 
White collar 40.00 40.20 0.20 0.24 0.813 
Blue collar 50.80 50.00 -0.80 0.64 0.524 
Women 32.10 33.20 1.10 1.22 0.224 
Firm characteristics     
Unions 82.40 87.40 5.00 3.61 0.0003* 
Employers' association 89.00 89.50 0.50 0.41 0.682 
Export 49.90 50.80 0.90 0.48 0.635 
Second-level bargaining     
Innovation 81.70 84.30 2.60 1.79 0.074* 
Firm age 30.94 31.67 0.72 0.78 0.438 
ln (Employees) 4.96 5.03 0.08 1.48 0.139 
Northwest 36.70 35.60 -1.10 0.59 0.557 
Northeast 36.50 38.70 2.30 1.2 0.232 
Centre 16.40 16.80 0.40 0.25 0.804 
Light manufacturing 11.60 13.60 2.00 1.54 0.123 
Heavy manufacturing 12.70 12.60 -0.10 0.09 0.929 
Machinery, computer, electrical equipment 13.80 14.10 0.40 0.27 0.789 
Construction 4.30 2.10 -2.20 3.2 0.0014* 
Trade, hotels and restaurants 7.90 6.80 -1.10 1.12 0.262 
Transportation and communications 14.30 13.10 -1.30 0.94 0.349 
Finance, Intermediation and other business services 17.10 18.80 1.70 1.15 0.250 
Education, health, private and social services 7.50 7.90 0.30 0.29 0.768 
Source: RIL-INAPP 2010 and 2014. Note: Values of outcomes and covariates used in the regressions of Table 4 are 
expressed in percentages with exception of ln (Sales per capita), firms age and ln (Employees). Omitted categorical 
variables are lower secondary and primary education for both managers and employees, south, and aggregated 
economic activity, including mining, quarrying and utilities.  
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Notes  
1 From a legal point of view, the different forms of company-level deviations mentioned above maintain a different 
meaning. In any case, for simplicity, we use the terms opening clauses, opting out clauses and other types of deviation 
clauses interchangeably because we are interested mainly in all those clauses allowing derogations in pejus from the 
minimum standards established by the industry-wide collective agreements. 
2 This value is a weighted average of the figures for the II level bargaining reported in Table A.2.  
3 Total separations include layoffs, retirements and voluntary separations. The shares of hiring and separations are 
calculated as number of individuals that join or leave the firm on total dependent employees at firm level. All forms of 
so-called ‘para-subordinate’ (or ‘semi-subordinate’) work, which has characteristics halfway between those of dependent 
employment and self-employment, do not enter the denominator of job separation and job creation rates. 
4 Note that before 2011, it was not possible to adopt opting out clauses, because the Law 148 was introduced in 2011.  
5 It is worth noting that for outcomes reported in i)-iv), ln sales per capita enters the set of control variables. 
6 For a better readability of Tables 3 and 4, we display few covariates of interest, in addition to the key explanatory 
variable OPTC. The results for all control variables used in equation 1 are available upon request. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
